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Digital image content authentication addresses the problem of detecting any illegitimate modification on the content of images.
To cope with this problem, a novel semifragile watermarking scheme using the pinned sine transform (PST) is presented in this
paper. The watermarking system can localize the portions of a watermarked image that have been tampered maliciously with high
accuracy as well as approximately recover it. In particular, the watermarking scheme is very sensitive to any texture alteration in
the watermarked images. The interblock relationship introduced in the process of PST renders the watermarking scheme resistant
to content cutting and pasting attacks. The watermark can still survive slight nonmalicious manipulations, which is desirable in
some practical applications such as legal tenders. Simulation results demonstrated that the probability of tamper detection of this
authentication scheme is higher than 98%, and it is less sensitive to legitimate image processing operations such as compression
than that of the equivalent DCT scheme.
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1. INTRODUCTION
While digital media oﬀer many distinct advantages over their
analog counterparts, the ease with which they can be edited
and tampered makes the protection of their integrity and au-
thenticity a serious and important issue. In certain practical
applications, such as remote sensing, legal defending, news
reporting, and medical archiving, there is a need for verifica-
tion or authentication of the integrity of the media content.
A fragile watermarking detects changes of the watermarked
image such that it can provide some form of guarantee that
the image has not been tampered with and is originated from
the right source. In addition, a fragile watermarking scheme
should be able to identify which portions of the watermarked
data are authentic and which are corrupted; if unauthenti-
cated portions are detected, it should be able to restore it [1].
The earliest fragile watermarking schemes are designed
to detect any slight changes to the bits of the watermarked
image and the watermark becomes undetectable after the wa-
termarked image is modified in any way [2, 3, 4, 5]. However,
since the meaning of multimedia data is generally based on
their semantic content rather than the bit streams, in some
applications, a semifragile watermarking is more desirable.
A semifragile watermarking seeks to verify that the content
of the multimedia has not been modified by any predefined
set of illegitimate distortions, while allowing modification by
legitimate distortions [1]. Although a variety of semifragile
watermarking schemes have been proposed in the literature
to solve this problem, the above issue of “selective content
authentication” has not been vigorously addressed.
In [6], Lin and Chang proposed a method that could lo-
calize malicious tampering to the image content while ac-
cepting JPEG compression to a predetermined quality factor
(QF). Their method achieved its goal by using an invariant
relationship between two DCT coeﬃcients in a block pair
before and after JPEG compressions. Such relationship was
encoded and inserted into the least significant bits (LSBs) of
rounded DCT coeﬃcients. Although their method proved to
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Figure 1: Watermark embedding process; the parts in the dashed windows are optional for the host image restoration.
be robust to JPEG compression by both mathematical de-
duction and experimental results, they actually proposed a
watermarking scheme that was very robust to JPEG compres-
sion rather than addressed the issue of selective content au-
thentication. Recently, some fragile watermarking schemes
using the wavelet domain have been proposed [7, 8, 9, 10].
The localization ability in both spatial domain and fre-
quency domain makes the wavelets a potential candidate for
semifragile watermarking. However, to authenticate content,
some significant features, for example, the edges of the host
image, are required to be encoded and embedded in the low
frequencies of the wavelet decomposition. Thus, there ex-
ists a tradeoﬀ between the visual quality of the watermarked
image and the ability of the scheme to detect changes. An-
other drawback of these schemes is the high computation
cost during the feature extraction and visual hash coding
processes.
Further ways to completely thwart many existing fragile
watermarking schemes are the “cutting and pasting” attacks.
The well-known vector quantization (VQ) counterfeiting at-
tacks [11] is one of such attacks. Some inter-relationship be-
tween the watermarked blocks is introduced to avoid the VQ
attacks [4, 5, 6]; however, a close relationship between uncor-
related blocks may come at the cost of reduced error localiza-
tion properties and introduce confusion for the consequent
authentication process.
In this paper, a novel semifragile watermarking scheme
using the pinned sine transform (PST) in [12] is proposed.
The motivation for developing a semifragile watermarking
based on PST is due to the observation that this trans-
form could provide an eﬀective way to solve both the above-
mentioned selective content authentication problem and the
issue of exposing the cutting and pasting counterfeiting at-
tacks. The observation is as follows. The PST conducts a
decomposition of the original image into two mutually un-
correlated fields, namely, the boundary field and the pinned
field. The texture information of the original image is con-
tained in the pinned field, wherein the sine transform is
equivalent to a fast Karhunen-Loeve transform (KLT). By ex-
ploiting this important property, we propose to embed a wa-
termark signal into the sine transform domain of the pinned
field for content authentication. As illustrated in this paper,
the proposed watermarking scheme is especially sensitive to
texture alterations of the host image while permitting con-
trolled amount of modifications to nontexture aspects of the
host image. Moreover, although our scheme is blockwise, the
watermarking of one block is closely related to all the blocks
surrounding it, in a way that will become apparent later in
this paper, which renders our scheme robust to the cutting
and pasting attacks.
Section 2 presents a brief review of the PST. The pro-
posed watermark embedding and image authentication pro-
cesses are then described in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.
In Section 5, we discuss how the proposed scheme ensures
a selective content authentication. The proposed scheme’s
resistance to VQ counterfeiting attacks is demonstrated in
Section 6, followed by experimental results and the conclu-
sion in Sections 7 and 8.
2. THE PINNED SINE TRANSFORM
An overview of the PST is discussed in this section. Suppose
a data vector
X = [x0 · · · xn+1]T (1)
is separated into a boundary response Xb defined by x0 and
xn+1, and a residual sequence X′ −Xb, where
X′ = [x1 · · · xn]T . (2)
In [13], Jain showed that ifX is a first-order stationary Gauss-
Markov sequence, the sequence X′ − Xb will have the sine
transform as its KLT.
Extending the above theory to the more general 2D case,
Meiri and Yudilevich [12, 14] proposed the PST for images.
An image field is decomposed into two subfields, namely,
the boundary field and a residual field. The boundary field
depends only on the block boundaries and for the residual
field, so-called the pinned field in [12], which vanishes at
the boundaries, its KLT is the sine transform. The detailed
PST process as well as the proposed watermark embedding
method based on this transform are found in the next sec-
tion.
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Figure 2: The dual-field decomposition in PST for a typical block.
3. WATERMARK EMBEDDING
The watermark embedding process is described in Figure 1.
The details are described as follows. The original image X
is partitioned into non-overlapping blocks of size k × k as
shown in Figure 2. Consider a typical block Xm,n, where m
and n are the coordinate numbers of this block, we define its
corner response as
cm,n =
(
c11, c1k, ck1, ckk
)
(3)
and its boundary response as
bm,n =
(
b1x,bkx,by1,byk
)
(4)
as illustrated in Figure 2. The corner response is obtained us-
ing the corner function
cm,n = C
[
Xu,v : m− 1 ≤ u ≤ m+ 1, n− 1 ≤ v ≤ n+ 1
]
. (5)
More specifically, the corner function is defined as follows:
c11 = Xm,n(1, 1)+Xm−1,n−1(k, k)+Xm−1,n(k, 1) +Xm,n−1(1, k)4 ,
c1k = Xm,n(1, k)+Xm−1,n(k, k)+Xm−1,n+1(k, 1) +Xm,n+1(1, 1)4 ,
ck1 = Xm,n(k, k)+Xm,n−1(k, k)+Xm+1,n−1(1, k) +Xm+1,n(1, 1)4 ,
ckk = Xm,n(k, k)+Xm,n+1(k, 1)+Xm+1,n(1, k) +Xm+1,n+1(1, 1)4 ;
(6)
and the boundary response is defined by the boundary func-
tion
bm,n = B
[
Xu,v : m− 1 ≤ u ≤ m + 1, n− 1 ≤ v ≤ n + 1
]
(7)
which is further defined as follows:
b1x(i) = Xm,n(1, i) +Xm−1,n(k, i)2 ,
bkx(i) = Xm,n(k, i) +Xm+1,n(1, i)2 ,
by1( j) = Xm,n( j, 1) +Xm,n−1( j, k)2 ,
byk( j) = Xm,n( j, k) +Xm,n+1( j, 1)2 .
(8)
As we can see from (5)–(8), the processing of one block
should involve all the blocks surrounding it, and we can ob-
serve in Figure 2 that in a sequential processing of blocks,
only one new corner ckk and two new boundaries bkx and
byk are required to be computed for a new input block.
The boundary field of Xm,n is achieved by the pinning
function [12]
Xbm,n = P
[
cm,n,bm,n
]
. (9)
Corresponding to the above general form, the specific form
of the pinning function is defined as follows:
Xbm,n(i, j) = Xm,n(1, 1) +
(
c1k − c11
) (i− 1/2)
k
+
(
ck1 − c11
) ( j − 1/2)
k
+
(
c11 + ckk − ck1 − c1k
) (i− 1/2)( j − 1/2)
k2
+ gx(i) +
(
hx(i)− gx(i)
) j − 1/2
k
+ gy( j) +
(
hy( j)− gy( j)
) i− 1/2
k
,
(10)
where
gx(i) = bkx(i)−
(
ck1 +
ckk − ck1
k
(
i− 1
2
))
,
hx(i) = b1x(i)−
(
c11 +
c1k − c11
k
(
i− 1
2
))
,
gy( j) = byk( j)−
(
c1k +
ckk − c1k
k
(
j − 1
2
))
,
hy( j) = by1( j)−
(
c11 +
ck1 − c11
k
(
j − 1
2
))
(11)
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are the pinned boundaries. The pinned field X
p
m,n is then
given by
X
p
m,n = Xm,n −Xbm,n. (12)
Next, we perform a sine transform to this pinned field
block as follows:
X
p(s)
m,n = SkXpm,nSTk , (13)
where Sk is the sine transform matrix of order k which is de-
fined as [15]
Sk(i, j) =
√
2
k + 1
sin
π(i + 1)( j + 1)
k + 1
, (14)
where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ k − 1.
We use a pseudorandom binary sequence as the water-
mark for image authentication. The length of the sequence
L and its initial state number is contained as a part of the
secret key file K . The watermark embedding process pro-
ceeds by embedding the Pseudorandom sequence into each
sine transformed pinned-field block.
Consider a certain transformed block X
p(s)
m,n ; we denote it
as
X
p(s)
m,n =
{
x
p(s)
m,n [t]
}
(15)
by viewing it column by column and with t ∈ T =
{1, 2, . . . , k2}. The watermark signal intended to be embed-
ded into this block is marked as
Wm,n =
{
wm,n[l]
}
(16)
with l ∈ L = {1, 2, . . . ,L} and wm,n[l] ∈ {0, 1}.
In the middle-to-high frequency bands of X
p(s)
m,n , we se-
lect, according to the length of the watermark sequence L,
coeﬃcients for watermarking modulation. Suppose the la-
belling set of these selected coeﬃcients is denoted as S =
{t1, t2, . . . , tL}; the watermarking function is then given by
Y
p(s)
m,n = F
[
X
p(s)
m,n ,Wm,n,K
]
, (17)
where
Y
p(s)
m,n =
{
y
p(s)
m,n [t]
}
, t ∈ T (18)
is the block of watermarked sine transform coeﬃcients. More
specifically, the watermarking function F[·] is defined as in
Algorithm 1.
If t ∈ S, then
if wm,n[lt] = 1, then
if x
p(s)
m,n [t] > λ, then
y
p(s)
m,n [t] = xp(s)m,n [t]
else
y
p(s)
m,n [t] = α1
end if
else if wm,n[lt] = 0, then
if x
p(s)
m,n [t] < −λ, then
y
p(s)
m,n [t] = xp(s)m,n [t]
else
y
p(s)
m,n [t] = α2
end if
end if
else if t /∈ S, then
y
p(s)
m,n [t] = xp(s)m,n [t]
End if
Algorithm 1
The variables involved in the problem are the following:
(i) x
p(s)
m,n [t] is the original coeﬃcient;
(ii) wm,n[lt] is the watermark to be embedded into x
p(s)
m,n [t];
(iii) y
p(s)
m,n [t] is the corresponding watermarked coeﬃcient;
(iv) λ is a suﬃciently large threshold of positive value. It
can be determined by users; its value will aﬀect the
tradeoﬀ between the perceptual quality of the water-
marked image and the probability of detection of the
watermarking scheme;
(v) α1 and α2 are floating point values chosen randomly
from [λ/2, λ] and [−λ,−λ/2], respectively.
The watermarked pinned field block is obtained by the
inverse 2D sine transform
Y
p
m,n = STk Yp(s)m,nSk (19)
and a watermarked block is therefore achieved by
Ym,n = Ypm,n +Xbm,n. (20)
After processing all the blocks, the watermarked image is
the union of all the watermarked blocks:
Y =
M⋃
m=1
N⋃
n=1
Ym,n, (21)
whereM ×N is the total number of blocks.
2178 EURASIP Journal on Applied Signal Processing
Test image
Residual
image
Pinned field
Boundary field
Detection
algorithm
Extracted
watermark
Original
watermark
Key Authenticated
or not
No
Restoration
algorithm
Recovery
bits
Restored image
Figure 3: Watermark detection and image authentication process; the parts in the dashed window are optional for host image restoration.
While t ∈ S do
if yˆ
p(s)
m,n [t] ≥ 0, then
wˆm,n[lt] = 1
else
wˆm,n[lt] = −1
End if
End while
Algorithm 2
4. WATERMARK DETECTION, IMAGE
AUTHENTICATION AND RESTORATION
The watermark detection and image authentication process
is illustrated in Figure 3. The detection system receives as in-
put a watermarked and possibly tampered image Ŷ. Similar
to the watermarking process, a decomposition is performed
on Ŷ by (3)–(12), and then we obtain the sine transform co-
eﬃcients of its pinned field by (13).
Consider the sine transform components matrix of a cer-
tain watermarked pinned filed block:
Ŷ
p(s)
m,n =
{
yˆ
p(s)
m,n [t]
}
(22)
by viewing it column by column and with t ∈ T =
{1, 2, . . . , k2}. The retrieved and possibly corrupted water-
mark Wˆm,n is decided based on the watermark detection
function
Wˆm,n = G
[
Ŷ
p(s)
m,n ,K
]
. (23)
More specifically, G[·] is given by Algorithm 2.
wˆm,n[lt] denotes the watermark bit retrieved from yˆ
p(s)
m,n [t],
and S has the same meaning as in Section 3, which is
achieved by the secret key fileK .
The original watermark signalWm,n is also generated us-
ing the initial state number in the K , and this binary se-
quence with elements {0, 1} is mapped into a corresponding
bipolar sequence with elements {−1, 1}. The watermark bits
are compared via the normalized cross correlation function
[16]:
ρ =
∑L
l=0 wˆm,n[l]wm,n[l][∑L
l=0
(
wˆm,n[l]
)2]1/2[∑L
l=0
(
wm,n[l]
)2]1/2 , (24)
where ρ ∈ [−1, 1].
The integrity of the block Ŷm,n is evaluated according to
the value of ρ. If no tampering ever occurred to this block,
ρ → 1; on the other hand, ρ will decrease due to diﬀer-
ent tampering of Ŷm,n. If the content of the block has been
changed, that is, the block has been replaced, due to prop-
erties of the normalized cross correlation function, ρ will be
extremely low.
Assume γ is a properly set threshold; the block is consid-
ered to be maliciously tampered with if ρ < γ. The thresh-
old is determined mathematically or experimentally so as
to maximize the probability of detection subject to a given
probability of false alarm. In our current simulations, γ is ex-
perimentally set to tolerate unavoidable nonmalicious mod-
ifications in some practical applications, such as JPEG com-
pression and noise addition, while maintaining the sensitiv-
ity of the authentication process to malicious modification
on the content of the watermarked images.
If some parts of the watermarked image are detected to be
removed or destroyed, these modified regions can be roughly
recovered using the method of self-embedding [5]. To facili-
tate a restoration process, the watermarking embedding and
detection processes in Sections 3 and 4 are modified slightly
as shown in the dash windows in Figures 1 and 3. In our
scheme, the down-sampled image is obtained by compress-
ing the two fields of the original image separately through
a sine transform coder as described in [12]. As mentioned
in Section 3, for the pinned field, the sine transform coder
is equivalent to a fast KLT coder, which results in optimal
coding. Another significant advantage of the PST coder over
the DCT technique in [5] is that it suppresses significantly
the block eﬀect appearing in the recovered image when the
compression rate is high by retaining the continuity between
blocks [12].
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: The dual-field decomposition in the PST of the Dubai image: (a) the original image, (b) the boundary field, and (c) the pinned
field.
(m,n)
Figure 5: The interblock relationship in the PST.
5. DUAL-FIELD DECOMPOSITION AND SELECTIVE
CONTENT AUTHENTICATION
The semifragile watermarking seeks a selective authentica-
tion on the content of images. Our scheme aims at protect-
ing the primary textures, such as edges, of the images. To
this end, the watermark should not survive the authentica-
tion process if such textures are tampered or damaged. The
results of the PST dual-field decomposition of the 512× 512
Dubai image using (3)–(12) are shown in Figure 4. We find
that the boundary field is only a blurred version of the orig-
inal image, while the pinned field is a good characterization
of edges, which largely reflects the texture information in
the original image. Thus the watermark can be embedded
into the pinned field as an indicator of the authenticity of
the watermarked image. Moreover, since most common im-
age manipulations tend to preserve such primary features of
images, this embedding method ensures that the watermark
does not suﬀer significantly from such legitimate manipula-
tions.
6. INTERBLOCK RELATIONSHIP AND
COUNTERFEITING ATTACKS
The most important malicious attacks on existing fragile wa-
termarking schemes are the “cutting and pasting” attacks.
The well-known VQ counterfeiting attack proposed by Hol-
liman and Memon [11] is one of such attacks, which thwarts
many existing blockwise fragile watermarking methods. In
this section, we briefly review the VQ attack by Holliman and
Memon and then explain why our scheme can survive the VQ
attack.
The success of the VQ attack is based on the assump-
tion that the attacker has a partial knowledge of the pos-
sible watermark patterns and it is not restrictive in public
applications. The attack starts by collecting a large num-
ber of watermarked images, and constructing the codebooks
by categorizing all the blocks in those images so that the
blocks in the same class correspond to the same watermark
pattern. Suppose that the attacker has an unmarked image
Z and intends to counterfeit from it an approximate im-
age Z′ which can pass the authentication system. He ex-
amines every block of Z, say, Zp,q, and identifies it as a
member of a certain class according to the specific wa-
termarking technique. He then replaces Zp,q with a water-
marked block in that class that minimizes the diﬀerence
between this block and Zp,q. As thus the attacker achieves
his goal without being detected by the authentication sys-
tem.
In our scheme, we exploit the intrinsic interblock depen-
dence in the PST to detect the above counterfeiting attacks.
The “PST style” encoding in (3)–(12) introduces an inter-
block relationship to the PST images as shown in Figure 5.
Therefore, the watermarking of any particular block also de-
pends on its location in the image instead of depending only
on its own content. Thus, simple VQ counterfeiting attack
can be exposed by this encoding style since the counterfeit
of one block aﬀects all the blocks around it; and the con-
struction of codebooks would be very diﬃcult for the reason
that the identification of one block should take all the blocks
around it into account.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6: The original images: (a) Couple, (b) Tank, and (c) Pyramids.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7: The watermarked images with recovery bits.
7. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Three 512×512 gray-scale images with diﬀerent contents and
textures were used to test our authentication algorithm. The
block size in our experiments was 8× 8. The original images
are shown in Figure 6. The images shown in Figures 6a and
6b are simple natural images, while Figure 6c is a satellite im-
age with complex texture and fine details. Figure 7 displays
the respective watermarked image. We can see that the wa-
termarked images look identical to the original images, with
PSNR greater than 33 dB.
We modified the content of the watermarked images in a
similar way to the cutting and pasting attacks: all the mod-
ifications were performed by cutting and pasting blocks in
the same or similar watermarked images. The modification
results are shown in Figures 8a–8c. The modifications made
to the respective images are as follows: the table in the bot-
tom right corner was removed from the Couple image; the
tank was shifted in the Tank image; and in the Pyramids im-
age, some geographical textures were modified. As illustrated
in Figures 8d–8f, the modified areas were accurately detected
and identified. The approximately recovered images are also
presented in Figure 8, which are shown to be visually accept-
able. We define the probability of tamper detection PTD of
the authentication scheme as
PTD = NUMdetectedNUMmodified , (25)
where NUMmodified is the number of actually modified
blocks, and NUMdetected is the number of correctly detected
blocks. In our experiments, PTD without nonmalicious at-
tacks was always higher than 98%.
We also tested the insensitivity of our algorithm to com-
pression. As shown in Figure 9, before compression, the out-
put ρ of the watermark detection system sharply peaked at
1; after compression, the values of ρ decreased as shown in
the same figure. To illustrate the advantage of PST water-
marking, we compare the performance of PST watermark-
ing with that of DCT watermarking. In the DCT water-
marking, the same watermark embedding method was used
and the same middle frequency-band coeﬃcients were se-
lected as those in the PST watermarking. The comparison
was based on the same PSNR values of the watermarked im-
ages and the results were obtained through averaging the
outcomes of the three test images. We found that after the
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Figure 8: Sample results of the proposed watermarking scheme: (a)–(c) modified images, (d)–(f) authentication outputs, and (g)–(i)
restoration outputs.
compression, the drop in the detector output ρ for the PST
watermarking was smaller than that of the DCT watermark-
ing. This indicates that the PST watermarking is less sensitive
to JPEG compression than the DCT watermarking, which
makes it a better candidate for semifragile watermarking.
Given a certain value of the threshold γ, the probability of
detection PD is shown as the shaded area in Figure 9. It is
apparent from this figure that the PD of the PST scheme
is larger than that of DCT. The collective comparison re-
sults with γ = 0.1 and varying compression quality factor
(QF) values are reported in Figure 10. The higher values of
PD indicated the better detection performance of PST over
DCT. Even when the images were in very poor quality as
shown in Figure 11, the PD of our scheme was still higher
than 95%.
The performance of our algorithm against JPEG com-
pression and additive noise from Stirmark 41 was also
tested. After content modification, the watermarked image
in Figure 8a was JPEG compressed with a QF of 90% and the
watermarked image in Figure 8c is added with an additive
white Gaussian noise of zero mean and a variance of σ2 = 5,
as shown in Figures 12a and 12b, respectively. As the recovery
bits were simply inserted into the pixels’ LSBs, the recovery
results are no longer correct. However, such manipulations
only have minimum eﬀect on the authentication process. As
indicated in Figures 12c and 12d, the modified area still can
be correctly identified.
1www.cl.cam.ac.uk/fapp2/watermarking/stirmark.
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Figure 9: The distribution of the watermark detection outputs before and after JPEG compression (QF = 40).
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Figure 10: Comparisons between PST watermarking and conventional DCT watermarking: the probability of detection after (a) JPEG
compression and (b) wavelet compression.
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we investigated the problem of the selective
content authentication of digital images through a novel
semifragile watermarking using the pinned sine transform
(PST). The watermark is embedded into the pinned field of
PST, which contains the texture information of the original
image. This important property of the pinned field provides
the scheme with special sensitivity to any texture alteration of
the watermarked image. The eﬀectiveness of the newmethod
has been demonstrated by using natural scene images and
satellite images. In the authentication process, the probabil-
ity of detection was higher than 98%. The scheme was very
robust to cutting and pasting counterfeiting attacks. It was
also able to tolerate some common image processing manip-
ulations; the probability of detection after JPEG compression
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(a) (b)
Figure 11: Attacked images. (a)Watermarked Couple image after JPEG compression (QF= 40). (b)Watermarked Couple image after wavelet
compression (QF= 60).
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 12: Sample authentication results after JPEG compression and additive noise from Stirmark 4. (a)Watermarked andmodified Couple
image after JPEG compression (QF= 90). (b) Watermarked and modified Pyramids image with additive noise (σ2 = 5). (c) Authentication
result of (a). (d) Authentication result of (b).
and wavelet compression is higher than that of equivalent
DCT scheme. In future work, we are interested in develop-
ing image authentication methods incorporating restoration
that can survive various nonmalicious manipulations.
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